The Current of Commerce: A Note on the Commerce Clause and the National Industrial Recovery Act by Ribble, F.D.G.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1934
The Current of Commerce: A Note on the
Commerce Clause and the National Industrial
Recovery Act
F.D.G. Ribble
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ribble, F.D.G., "The Current of Commerce: A Note on the Commerce Clause and the National Industrial Recovery Act" (1934).
Minnesota Law Review. 1291.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1291
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE "CURRENT OF COMMERCE :" A NOTE ON THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT.
By F. D. G. RIBBLE*
A NY far reaching and novel legislation necessarily raises num-
erous constitutional problems. There has been no better
illustration in the history of American law than is found in the
National Industrial Recovery Act.'
A reading of the Act will call to mind familiar principles: the
separation of powers, so dear to the framers of the constitution,
and the related limitations on delegation of legislative power; the
broad guarantees of due process of law, both as to the ideal of "a
day in court," and as to reverence for "liberty" and "property"
which are to be protected; the powers of the states over their
systems of internal police;2 as well as many other doctrines of
constitutional law. The Act might well furnish a starting point
for a course of study in the American constitution.
The reader who lays aside the Act and turns to the cases will
not find them wholly reassuring. The provisions for minimum
wages in the various codes must suggest the unhappy fate of the
minimum wage law for women, enacted by Congress for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.3 The now famous section 7a of the Act recalls,
in particular, the failure in Adair v. The United States4 of the
effort of Congress to protect from loss of employment those work-
ers in interstate commerce desiring membership in labor unions.
Apart from that vast category of enterprises conveniently desig-
nated by the term of "businesses affected with a public interest,"
price fixing has found slight favor in the Supreme Court deci-
sions.' But perhaps the most notable of the precedents is found
*Professor of Law, University of Virginia Department of Law, Char-
lottesville, Virginia.
'Public No. 67-73d Congress, approved June 16, 1933. See Handler,
The National Industrial Recovery Act, (1933) 19 Am. B. A. J. 440; note
(1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 85.
2See Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 208,
6 L. Ed. 23.
3Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394,
67 L. Ed. 785.
4(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436.
5See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup.
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in the greatly discussed child labor case.6 Congress was unable
to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods
produced in factories employing child labor. Inevitably it will be
asked whether Congress is similarly unable to prohibit the trans-
portation in interstate commerce of goods produced under other
conditions of which Congress or the president disapproves. The
licensing provisions of the Act contemplate, as a means of its
enforcement, that under specified conditions certain persons may
be prohibited from engaging in interstate commerce.'
The present situation differs so widely from that presented in
any of the prior cases, both as to the nature of the statutes involved
and as to the economic conditions in relation to which they operate,
that those who seek distinguishing features have a wealth of mate-
rial with which to work. A discussion of that material would far
transcend the limits of this paper.
Basically the Act depends upon the power of Congress to
regulate commerce. If other constitutional provisions are offended
against, it is quite likely that they may be circumvented by changes
in the Act without too great a sacrifice to the whole plan. But if
Congress has not the necessary power to enact this legislation
under the commerce clause, it would seem that the plan in any-
thing like its present form is doomed, so long as the constitution
as it is now known survives.
This discussion is directed to the power under the commerce
clause. It purports merely to be suggestive of certain topics
deemed particularly relevant to the question of the power of Con-
gress to coerce compliance with the National Industrial Recovery
Act. The right of a Nation, in its need, to call upon the good will
and the voluntary action of its people for the common good is not
in question. Nor need there be constitutional question of the
inducements offered by way of relaxations of the anti-trust laws.8
Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rela-
tions, (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103; Tyson and
Bro. v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718;
Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913;
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., (1929) 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73
L. Ed. 287; Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton, (1927)
27 Col. L. Rev. 769; (1933) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 63. Compare People v.
Nebbia, (N.Y. 1933) 186 N. E. 694; United States v. Calistan Packers,(D.C. Cal. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 660.
6Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L.
Ed. 1101.7Sec. 4 (b), National Industrial Recovery Act.8See Dickinson, Major Issues Presented by the Industrial Recovery
Act, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 1095.
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In dealing with the commerce clause in this connection it will be
wise to start with a reference to the oft repeated idea of the exist-
ence of emergency powers.
EMERGENCY POWERS
The Act begins by declaring the existence of a national emer-
gency. Discussions in the public press not infrequently assume
that an emergency may be made the basis of constitutional power,
and intimations of this appear in judicial opinions dealing with
the recovery program.9 In a sense this is true, but the sense needs
to be carefully examined. It is not to be suggested here that
when the need is deemed great a constitutional method will, in
general, be found. Such a statement may be merely a prophecy
as to human ingenuity. As such, whether accurate or not, it is
beyond the limits of constitutional theory. The statement may be
a tribute to the great flexibility of the constitution. As great as
that flexibility is, it is but a truism to say that it has pronounced
limits.
It cannot be imagined that in emergencies, however dire, the
constitution can be legally suspended. To make the contrary
statement is to refute it. Such a theory would place all constitu-
tional guarantees in the hands of the person or persons in whom
rested the power to determine the existence of the emergency. A
frequently quoted statement is that of Mr. Justice Davis in Ex
Parte Milligan."0
"No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of govern-
ment. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism.. .."
While emergencies cannot be made the basis for the suspen-
sion of the constitution, they are not, for that reason, to be dis-
9In Southport Petroleum Co. v. Ickes, (D.C. Sup. Ct 1933) 61 Wash.
L. Rep. 577, the Court said: "The rationale of the doctrine of self-protection
is that the necessity for it is inherent in the nature of every organism. The
idea back of this law is sometimes expressed as 'necessity knows no law,'
or as 'self-preservation is the first law of nature.' This principle, at least
to some degree, also extends to governments. . . .While the courts hold
that the constitution is not suspended or set aside by war or national emer-
gency, it is thought that the constitution and all other laws must be read
in the light of and, to some extent, subject to the primal and fundamental
concept of the necessity for self-preservation." See also Economy Dairy
Co. v. Wallace, (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1933) 61 Wash. L. Rep. 633; comment in
(1933) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 68.
-0(1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2, 121, 18 L. Ed. 281.
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missed from consideration. They are relevant in ascertaining the
extent of constitutional grants and limitations1oa It is possible
that the word "emergency" has at times an unfortunate connota-
tion, as suggesting the need of extraordinary powers, above con-
stitutional limitations. It may be wise to use the expression
"occasional powers" instead, as meaning powers the existence and
scope of which are determined by particular occasions. Occa-
sional powers, thus described, are familiar phenomena in consti-
tutional law. Reference to them may not be nearly as disturbing
as reference to emergency powers. Obviously, an unusual or
important occasion will readily be termed an emergency. It may
be comforting to realize that Congress and the state legislatures
have been dealing with occasions-or emergencies-since our gov-
ernment began without the need of scrapping or overriding the
constitution.
The obvious illustration of an occasional power lies in the war
power."' Many things may be done in war which cannot be done
in peace.12 It will not be intimated that this is a "war on depres-
sion" and accordingly the war powers can be invoked. To do so
would be to confuse rhetoric with law. Yet the example readily
serves to recall that powers may depend upon the occasion of
their exercise.
The war power is expressly an occasional power. Other
powers and limitations have occasional features, though not ex-
pressly so declared. Illustrations may be readily found in connec-
tion with the two due process limitations. The housing legislation
in Washington, designed to meet conditions arising out of the war
time congestion in that city, furnishes an excellent case in point.
This legislation, providing for limitations on rents and evictions,
was sustained. 3 Yet it can scarcely be doubted that the same en-
2OaHome Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, (U.S. 1934) 54
Sup. Ct. 231.
"United States constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
12See Miller v. United States, (1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 268, 20 L. Ed.
135; Abrams v. United States, (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 63 L.
Ed. 1173; Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. United States, (1923) 261 U. S.
502, 43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773; Littlejohn and Co. v. ,United States,
(1926) 270 U. S. 215, 46 Sup. Ct. 244, 70 L. Ed. 520.
'
8Block v. Hirsh, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed.
865. See also Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, (1921) 256 U. S.
170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, (1922) 258
U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595; Chastleton Corporation v.
Sinclair, (1924) 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841; Wicker-
sham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, (1921)
69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 301; Burdick, Constitutionality of the New York
Rent Laws, (1921) 6 Corn. L. Q. 310.
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actment would not have been upheld at certain other times; for
example, 1913. In giving the opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes
said:
"The general proposition to be maintained is that circumstances
have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia
with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law.
Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space
as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other
places would be a matter of purely private concern.' 1 4
Later in the same opinion the justice said:
"The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary meas-
ure. A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may jus-
tify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change."' 5
Accordingly, businesses may be "affected with a public inter-
est" at one time and not at another. For present purposes that
statement may be taken as simply another way of saying that the
due process clause in the fifth amendment furnishes less restraint
on Congress under some conditions than under others. Correla-
tively it may be said that Congress has greater powers under some
conditions than under others. Of course the same result is
achieved with reference to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and state legislative powers.
The Supreme Court has not been generous in recent years in
extending the category of "businesses affected with a public inter-
est."'" A federal district court, in the late case of United States
v. Calistan Packers,17 has indicated a far more liberal trend, due
to present conditions. In the case, arising out of conditions in the
peach canning industry, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
sustained as an exercise of the commerce power. The court stated,
apparently with a touch of local pride, that ninety-nine and nine-
tenths per cent of the national production of canned peaches for
interstate and foreign commerce was packed in California. That,
it must be admitted, is a goodly percentage even for California.
After taking judicial notice of the existence of a national emer-
gency and after reviewing the depressed condition of the peach
industry, the court declared:
14Block v. Hirsh, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865.
15Block v. Hirsh, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 155, 157, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65
L. Ed. 865.
"
6 New York State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, (1932) 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup.
Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747; notes (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 913, (1932) 17 Corn.
L. Q. 662, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1277, (1932) 18 Va. L. Rev. 769. See
ante note 5 and cases cited.
'T(D.C. Cal. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 660. See ante note 9.
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"Under conditions such as these the court is bound to arrive
at the conclusion that the peach industry is affected with a national
public interest and that the Congress has the constitutional power
to adopt appropriate legislation to cure these evils."18
This statement was made in meeting an attack under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Whatever may be thought
of its accuracy, it yet furnishes a striking judicial declaration of
the effect of an emergency.
This effect is perhaps clearest in cases involving the limitations
imposed by the due process clauses. Frequent illustrations have
been presented in instances of state legislation challenged under
the fourteenth amendment. In such cases the existence of legis-
lative power to curtail earlier concepts of "liberty" and "prop-
erty" in the interests of a present determination of the public
good is thoroughly familiar.' 9 The requirements of the public
good .are, of course, not constant but change with changin~g con-
ditions, whether or not those changing conditions be dignified by
being called emergencies.
Though possibly not so apparent, the similar effect of an emer-
gency may be discerned in connection with the commerce clause.
Congress has the power to remove obstructions from interstate
commerce. Without delving here into the intricacies of what is
and what is not an "obstruction" within the meaning of this prin-
ciple, it will be readily apparent that all obstructions are not con-
stant. That which is an actual obstruction, or readily capable of
becoming one, at one time may be wholly innocuous at another.
To say that Congress may meet the danger when it arises, but can-
not regulate matters internal to the states on the basis of fanciful
or imaginary difficulties to commerce, is but to say that the com-
merce power extends to that which may fairly be considered, with
due concern for the limits of legislative discretion, to be the prac-
tical need. The validity of enactments will then change with the
need. Whether the power supporting the particular legislation be
described as an occasional power or as an emergency power within
the limits of the general power over commerce, or how it be desig-
nated is not material. It is material, however, to scotch the notion,
is(D.C. Cal. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 660, 661.
19See Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, (1910) 216 U. S. 358, 30
Sup. Ct. 301, 54 L. Ed. 515; Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, (1915) 239 U. S.
394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., (1926)
272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303; Miller v. Schoene, (1928)
276 U. S. 272, 48 Sup'. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568.
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which unihformed discussion may breed, that emergency powers
are apart from or above the constitution.
The commerce clause has sufficed to meet drastic emergencies
in times past. Notable is the case of Wilson v. New.20 Facing
the prospect of a general strike among railway employees which
would paralyze the transportation facilities of .the country, Con-
gress, under the guns, so to speak, passed the Adamson Act. The
Act was sustained in the Supreme Court by the small margin of
one vote. Here the inability of management and labor to agree
threatened to furnish an obstruction which would almost complete-
ly dam the flow of commerce. Congress successfully removed the
obstruction.
Chief Justice White, for the majority, argued that the power
to regulate must involve the power to protect from destruction
that which is to be regulated. The analogy between a paralyzing
strike and a paralyzing depression as obstructions to the flow of
commerce may be of more than passing interest. In the course
of his opinion the Chief Justice said:
.. . . although an emergency may not call into life a power which
has never lived, nevertheless emergency may furnish a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed. If acts which, if
done, would interrupt, if not destroy, interstate commerce may be
by anticipation legislatively prevented, by the same token the power
to regulate may be exercised to guard against the cessation of
interstate commerce threatened by a failure of employers and em-
ployees to agree as to the standard of wages, such standard being
an essential prerequisite to the uninterrupted flow of interstate
commerce."
21
The quotation is interesting as indicating that in that emer-
gency the standard of wages was the obstruction which Congress
could remove. True the standard applied to those engaged in the
very core of interstate commerce, actual transportation. Yet it
was the effectiveness of the obstruction and not its precise nature
which seemed chiefly to impress the court.
The layman may be impatient of such distinctions, with refer-
ence to emergency powers. Yet emergency powers under the
constitution are manifestly vastly different from such powers apart
20(1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755. See Powell,
The Supreme Court and the Adamson Law, (1917) 65 ,U. of Pa. L. Rev.
607. An interesting comment on the emergency which brought about the
passage of the Adamson Act will be found in Daniels, American Railroads
(1932) 83 ff.21Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 348, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61
L. Ed. 755.
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from or above the constitution. The former have limitations, both
as to their extent and as to the agencies for their exercise, imposed
by and in consequence of the instrument to which they owe their
existence. True those limitations are not sharply defined, but they
are none the less real. The latter would have no limitations. They
are the negation of government under law, and, as declared by
Justice Davis, must needs be productive of anarchy and despot-
ism.
THE EXISTENCE OF LImITATIONS UPON THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO EXCLUDE ARTICLES FROM INTERSTATE COMMERCE
An unlimited power in Congress to stop the movement of goods
and persons between the states would obviously be sufficient to
supply the means for the enforcement of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. It would also provide a means of controlling most
of the details of life in the United States. For business enter-
prises, except small industries of a local nature, the threat of ex-
clusion from markets in other states would be sufficient to compel
compliance with any requirement not immediately productive of
bankruptcy. For most individuals, the denial of the right to leave
the state would be an efficient penalty in coercing compliance with
nearly any standard of conduct prescribed, so far as a standard
of conduct can ever be coerced by penalties. For a state, the
menace of an embargo on its products, or the exclusion of prod-
ucts of other states, would compel a reluctant cooperation with
almost any course Congress cared to pursue.
Among the many problems presented by the commerce clause,
few have furnished as much discussion as that of the existence or
non-existence of limitations on the power of Congress to exclude
goods and persons from interstate commerce, and of the nature of
such limitations if any exist.22 At least one such limitation, that
of due process of law, has been recognized by the Supreme Court.22
22A most useful recent treatment is presented in Corwin, Congress's
Power to Prohibit Commerce, A Crucial Constitutional Issue, (1933) 18
Corn. L. Q. 477. See also Bikl6, The Commerce Power and Hammer v.
Dagenhart, (1919) 67 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 21; Bruce, Interstate Commerce
and Child Labor, (1919) 3 MINNESOrA LAW REviEw 89; Cushman, Na-
tional Police Power under the Constitution, (1919) 3 MINNESoTA LAW
REvmrW 289, 381, 452; Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause, (1918) 3 So. L. Q. 175-202; Gordon, The
Child Labor Law Case, (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 45.
23Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. v. United States, (1931) 284
U. S. 80, 52 Sup. Ct. 87, 76 L. Ed. 177. Compare Adair v. United States,(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436.
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A forceful declaration of broad powers in Congress is found in
the notable dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the child labor case.24
In particular, one sentence from that dissent may be quoted:
"Regulation means the prohibition of something, and when inter-
state commerce is the matter to be regulated I cannot doubt that
the regulations may prohibit any part of such commerce that Con-
gress sees fit to forbid." 25
It is clear, and need not be argued today, that the framers of
the constitution did not plan to confer a general power on Congress
to regulate the minute details of life throughout the United
States.28  If they achieved this result by indirection, they builded
differently than they knew. Whether they builded better or not
will be a matter on which opinion may well be divided. If the
power was granted, the history of this nation has from the first
been marked by a singular lack of understanding of the funda-
mental document of its government. "No political dreamer," de-
clared Marshall, "was ever wild enough to think of breaking down
the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the Ameri-
can people into one common mass." 27 Again, the hornbrook asser-
tion that the federal government is one of enumerated powers and
that it can exercise only the powers granted to it2 8 is thoroughly
deceptive, if by direction or indirection it can control all of the
details of life within the United States. If, in effect, all powers
were delegated, the tenth amendment is a gross delusion.
2
1
24Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62
L. Ed. 1101.26Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L.
Ed. 1101.28
"The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the
frame of a national government, of special and enumerated powers, and
not of general and unlimited powers." Story, Commentaries on the Con-
stitution, 5th ed. p. 663. See Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U. S. 46,
27 Sup. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956; Cushman, National Police Power under
the Constitution, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 289, 290 ff. Compare
Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce, A Crucial Constitutional
Issue, (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 477, 481 ff.
.
27McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 403, 4 L. Ed.579.
28"This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it,
would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced by all those
arguments. . . . That principle is now universally admitted. But the ques-
tion respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually
arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall
exist." Marshall, C. J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat.
(U.S.) 316, 405, 4 L. Ed. 579.29Constitution of the United States, tenth amendment. "The powers not
delegated to the .United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
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It cannot be doubted that Congress can exclude from commerce
that which is immediately dangerous or injurious to such com-
merce as, for example, dynamite improperly packed. 80 The sim-
plest protection of commerce demands as much. This is quite a
different type of exclusion from that relating to certain small bits
of cardboard, whose only value depends upon the numbers printed
upon them. And this is true even though in an extravagant out-
burst of righteousness the Court could speak of interstate com-
merce as being "polluted" by lottery tickets.", It is, again, quite
a different type of exclusion from that designed to compel some
standard of conduct with reference to articles before they are
shipped. 2 Further, it differs from exclusion, irrespective of the
nature of the thing excluded, as a penalty to render effective any
policy desired. It may be urged that these differences relate pri-
marily to the purpose of Congress and that the purpose of Con-
gress in the exercise of its powers is beyond judicial inquiry. If
any exclusion is to be held invalid, it will be because of limitations
in the constitution. It will not be necessary to inquire into the
"purpose" of Congress, except in so far as purpose is used to
mean fairly contemplated effect.
The Lottery CaseA3 and its successors have been so often dis-
cussed" that one hesitates to pass them in review again. How-
ever, their importance is such that a brief reference to them must
be made.
The Court was gravely troubled by the Lottery Case. The
case was argued three times, and the act, prohibiting the sending
of lottery tickets through interstate commerce, was finally sus-
tained by a vote of five to four. The majority found that the
transmission of lottery tickets from state to state was interstate
commerce and that the power to regulate included this prohibition.
The Act was further looked upon as being an aid to rather than
an invasion of the police powers of the states. It protected states
desiring to suppress lotteries from being flooded from without the
state. Any state which favored lotteries would doubtless find local
enterprise, ready, willing and able to carry them on.
30See 14 Stat. at L. 81.
31The Lottery Case, (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 356, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47
L. Ed. 492.
32Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62
L. Ed. 1101.
33(1903) 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492.
84See supra. n. 22.
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Shortly after the passage of the lottery statute, Congress for-
bade the sending of "obscene" literature through interstate com-
merce. ' 5 Subsequently the same prohibition was applied to wild
game illegally killed.38 Both statutes were sustained in the federal
courts.37 The "Pure Food Act" of 1906 denied the facilities of
interstate commerce to adulterated or misbranded foods and
drugs.8s With scant question the validity of this act was sus-
tained.""
Later the Court upheld the "Mann Act"40 prohibiting the trans-
portation of women in interstate commerce for purposes of prosti-
tution or for any other immoral purpose.41 Next the Congressional
interdict upon the importation of opium was allowed. 42 By act of
1912, prize fight films and pictures were excluded from interstate
and foreign commerce. 43  This statute was attacked with refer-
ence to foreign commerce and successfully met the testj 4  In this
group of cases there should also be included the Webb Kenyon
Act,45 superseding the earlier Wilson Act,40 and prohibiting the
transportation of intoxicating liquor from one state into another
state in violation of any law of the latter state. The act, which
was sustained, 47 presents the feature of a prohibition dependent
upon and in accord with state law. Subsequently, in the Reed
"Bone Dry" Amendment,4 the prohibition was successfully car-
ried beyond the limits of state law.41
8529 Stat. at L. 512.
3631 Stat. at L. 188. The test of the legality of the killing was sup-
plied by the game laws of the several states.37
.United States v. Popper, (D.C. Cal. 1899) 98 Fed. 423 (obscene
literature). This decision was cited with approval in Hoke v. United
States, (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523. Rupert v.
United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 87 (game illegally killed).
3834 Stat. at L. 768.39Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, (1911) 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct.
364, 55 L. Ed. 364.4036 Stat. at L. 825.41Hoke v. United States, (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57
L. Ed. 523.42Brolan v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 216, 35 Sup. Ct. 285, 59
L. Ed. 544.
4337 Stat. at L. 240.4 4Weber v. Freed, (1915) 239 U. S. 325, 36 Sup. Ct 131, 60 L. Ed.
308; United States v. Johnson, (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 232 Fed. 970.
4537 Stat. at L. 699.
4626 Stat. at L. 313.
47Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., (1917) 242 U. S.
311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326.
4839 Stat. at L. 1058, 1069.
4AUnited States v. Hill, (1919) 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143, 63
L. Ed. 337.
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These cases of Congressional prohibition of interstate com-
merce, present a record of complete consistency. The Court
seemed able to proceed almost mechanically with the general ideas
that interstate movement was interstate commerce, that regulation
included prohibition, and that the reasons which motivated Con-
gress, at least in the cases presented, were not. within the purview
of the Court. Yet this smooth course of decision was abruptly
interrupted.
The federal statute before the Court in the child labor case
prohibited any producer, manufacturer or dealer from shipping in
interstate commerce the product of any mine, quarry or factory
in which, within thirty days prior to the removal of the product
therefrom, children had been employed. 50 By a vote of five to
four the statute was held invalid.5
The view of the majority, briefly stated, was that the statute
in question was a prohibition of commerce and hence not a regu-
lation, and that it was, in effect, a regulation of manufacturing
which was internal to the states and not a part of interstate com-
merce. In distinguishing the preceding cases reliance was had
upon ideas which may best be stated in two sentences from the
opinion of the Court.
"They [the earlier cases] rest upon the character of the par-
ticular subjects dealt with and the fact that the scope of govern-
mental authority, state or national, possessed over them is such
that the authority to prohibit is as to them but the assertion of
the power to regulate. ' ' 2 "In each of these instances the use of
interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of
harmful results."5' s
The Court saw in the instant case a contrast with those preceding
it in that the goods were harmless54 and the evil of child labor on
the goods was complete before interstate commerce began. 55
The first statement intermingles state and federal power at
the moment at which the Court was seeking to differentiate them.
3039 Stat, at L. 675. The minimum age for employment in a mine or
quarry was sixteen years. In a factory the minimum was fourteen years.51Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62
L. Ed. 1101.52Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 270, 38 Sup. Ct. 529,
62 L. Ed. 1101.5 Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 271, 38 Sup. Ct. 529,
62 L. Ed. 1101.54Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 272, 38 Sup. Ct. 529,
62 L. Ed. 1101.55Compare Brooks v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup.
Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699.
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It also distinguishes between bad articles and good articles and
assumes that the Court is ultimately to determine whether the
articles are good or bad. This implies the application of the test
of due process of law, as that limitation has been developed in
certain instances of state legislation challenged under the four-
teenth amendment.
The second basis of distinction fails to give consideration to
the rather obvious fact that the extra-state market was in large
measure necessary for the continued exploitation of child labor.
In this sense, the use of interstate commerce was necessary to the
harmful result. However, this harm was in the state of origin of
the goods shipped, which state could protect itself from the evil.
In other cases the harm was in the state of destination, which was
normally unable to exclude the harm-producing goods. The dis-
tinction here drawn might be taken to mean, as before, that Con-
gress may exclude "bad" goods from interstate commerce, but
with the added idea that "badness" is to be ascertained with refer-
ence to the harm likely to ensue in the state or states of destina-
tion. Since the states are not allowed to protect themselves from
such harm-producing goods, it is only fair that Congress should
be able to protect them. The helplessness of the states and the
value of federal cooperation are more apparent in cases where the
state had acted, as in the case of liquor prohibition. There the
state has determined the existence of the evil. While Congress
may determine what is evil independently of state decision, its
determination is fortified morally, at least, by state concurrence.
In dealing with harm to the states of destination, the Court ex-
plicitly refused to consider the effect of competition from child-
made goods on industries in states prohibiting child labor. Harm
to the state of destination resulting from unfair competition in
the state of origin was expressly declared to be beyond the power
of Congress to eliminate. It would be useful to have comprehen-
sive figures on which some conclusion might be based as to the
extent of this harm. Conceivably, the employment of child labor
gave but slight competitive advantage in the markets of other
states. If the advantage were so great as to be ruinous or seri-
ously detrimental to competitors, the Court might not have been
willing to treat it so lightly.
Since the failure of the child labor statute, Congress has en-
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acted measures closing interstate commerce to automobile thieves56
and to kidnappers5 7  Popular sentiment has applauded the use of
the long arm of the federal government in seizing these criminals.
Common consent does not connote constitutionality. Yet these
statutes, however considered, can scarcely be deemed inconsistent
with the principles laid down in the child labor case. That opin-
ion recognized the existence of a power in Congress to forbid the
use of interstate commerce as a means in the achievement of harm-
ful or illegal results, at least in the state or states of destination.
It refused to include in this power exclusion designed to prevent
such harmful results as might flow from "possible unfair compe-
tition." This limitation had no bearing on the subsequent stat-
utes. The acts at which they are aimed are detested crimes in all
states, and the harm exists in the states of destination as well as
in those of origin.
A word may be said by way of conclusion in this phase of the
present note. The expression "a regulation of interstate com-
merce" is used without careful discrimination in what may be
termed a factual sense and again as a conclusion of law. It can
scarcely be denied that in one sense the statute in the child labor
case was a regulation of interstate commerce. It prescribed a
rule dealing with such commerce. The minority accordingly saw
in the statute such a regulation. On the other hand, the major-
ity could say: "The Act in its effect does not regulate transporta-
tion among the states... " The conclusion of the majority that
the act was not a regulation of interstate commerce within the
meaning of the constitution was a determination of law, a state-
ment of result.
The commerce clause is limited by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment."' It would also seem to be limited by other
clauses, such as the guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press, etc. Likewise, constitutional limitations need not stand in
the express terms of a specific provision, but may exist by reason
of the cumulative effect of several provisions.5 9 In groping for
5841 Stat. at L. 324. See Brooks v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S.
432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699.
7.June 22, 1932, 47 Stat. at L. ch. 271. See also Hawes-Cooper Act,
45 Stat. at L. 1084; Davis, The Hawes-Cooper Act is Unconstitutional,
(1930) "23 Lawyer and Banker 296.
58Supra, n. 23.
69An excellent illustration of this is to be found in cases dealing with
federal taxation directly affecting or burdening the governmental instru-
mentalities of a state. The power to tax is granted in general terms, yet
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constitutional theory, it seems fair to describe the statute in the
child labor case as a regulation of interstate commerce, in the
sense that it prescribed a rule dealing with such commerce, but to
explain its failure on the ground that it was deemed to transcend
certain constitutional limitations. The Court patently had in mind
two limitations: the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
and the principle, variously described, which asserts that the con-
stitution contemplates the continued existence of the states, not
simply by the grace of Congress, but by reason of powers not
granted to the central government. 0
It may be argued that in simple logic the latter proposition has
no bearing here. The powers not delegated to the United States,
nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or to the
people. The power to regulate commerce is expressly delegated.
Accordingly, it cannot be affected by the invocation of reserved
powers. Yet the answer must be equally clear. The power to
regulate commerce cannot be so construed that by direction or
indirection it swallows all powers which might be left to the states.
To allow this is to give that power a broader meaning than could
ever have been intended. The method ascribed to simple logic
may be deceptive here in that it assumes a certainty and rigidity in
the determination of a "regulation of interstate commerce" which
cannot be had. It is necessary to consider other parts of the con-
stitution. The same argument might equally well have been used
in the tax cases, yet limitations on the power to levy taxes are
clear. 61
limitations on the use of that power so far as it affects the governmental
activities of the states are thoroughly established. Collector v. Day, (1870)
11 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L. Ed. 122; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United
States, (1931) 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L. Ed. 1277. Thus the
grant of power to Congress in the sixteenth amendment "to lay and collect
taxes on income, from whatever source derived" does not include the power
to collect income taxes from regularly employed state governmental offi-
cials. Frey v. Woodworth (D.C. Mich. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 725. See Magill,
Tax Exemption of State Employees, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 956; Cohen and
Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 807.
With reference to this constitutional immunity Chief Justice Hughes has
recently said: "It is a principle implied from the necessity of maintaining
our dual system of government."- Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 48, 59, 53 Sup. Ct. 509, 77 L.
Ed. 1025.
6 Supra, n. 59.
6lIbid. In Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United
States, (1933) 289 U. S. 48, 57, 53 Sup. Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025, Chief
Justice Hughes said: "The principle of duality in our system of government
does not touch the authority of Congress in the regulation of foreign com-
merce." It will be observed that this is limited to foreign commerce. The
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A chief justice of the United States has declared: "The con-
stitution, in all of its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible states.16 2 It surely has never contem-
plated states whose every act might be controlled and whose very
existence as political units might be snuffed out by Congress. Yet
these results may be accomplished by an unlimited power to con-
trol movement into and out of the states. If the suggestion sounds
like the fanciful creation of a hobgoblin, fit only to scare children,
it should be answered that this discussion is directed to power and
not to probabilities .of its abuse.
The Court seems to have felt in the child labor case that a
line had to be drawn somewhere shortly, or the dual structure of
our government would have been completely changed by the grad-
ual process of legislative and judicial erosion. Whether the Court
made a happy choice of a place for drawing the line may be seri-
ously questioned. But the writer does not question the political
wisdom of or the constitutional sanction for drawing a line such
as will leave, as of right, some substantial autonomy to the states.
In other words, he cannot subscribe to the idea that Congress has
a blanket authority to prohibit interstate commerce, irrespective
of its effect upon state governments.
In the application of this limitation the Court must work out
some balance between the value of state autonomy on one side
and the value of the elimination of friction caused by the various
systems of state law on the other. The latter entails enforced
state non-interference in certain instances. The Court may well
ask itself two questions. (1) How important is it to the several
states that each be allowed to handle this situation within its own
borders? (2) How important is it to the several states that no
state be allowed to be a free lance in the matter? There must be
the further question constantly in mind: What effect is to be
given to the fact of Congressional determination?
The query may here be made whether the answer to the two
questions stated, so far as economic life is concerned, may not be
fairly resolved in terms of interstate commerce. That is to say,
power to regulate foreign commerce cannot possibly present the means
of controlling matters internal to the states, such as may be presented by a
sweeping construction of the power to regulate interstate commerce. See
constitution of the United States, article I, sec. 9: "No preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the parts of one state
over those of another."62Chase, C. J., in Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 725, 19
L. Ed. 227.
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any matter as to which independent and uncontrolled action by a
state or its people will work serious consequences upon the eco-
nomic life of other states, out of proportion to the benefits to the
states of action, may be said to be interstate commerce or so to
affect it as to come within the federal power. Federal power,
under this approach, depends upon the idea of "a current of com-
merce" and not upon any blanket authority in Congress to stop
interstate movement whenever it wills.
A wise principle of the division of power between the states
and nation was declared in the first of the commerce cases, 63 was
rediscovered and stated in altered form in Cooley v. Board of
WYardens, 64 and has been the constant background of the develop-
ment of the subject. Powers which "can be most advantageously
exercised by the states" are to be left with the states. The cases
will not support the idea that what is left to the states is entirely
due to the forbearance of Congress.
THE CURRENT OF COMMERCE
The National Industrial Recovery Act does not require a
blanket power in Congress to prohibit interstate commerce. A
more substantial basis for the Act may readily be invoked. In
turning to the expansive idea of the power of Congress over the
current of commerce-the course of trade-it will be well to start
with a meaning of the familiar term "interstate commerce." In
the light of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, in-
terstate commerce may be fairly described as movement, subject,
at least in part, to human direction or control, which movement
starts in one state and continues into another.6 5
6 3Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 203, 6 L. Ed. 23.
64(1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996.
65As early as Railroad Company v. Husen, (1887) 95 U. S. 465, 470,
24 L. Ed. 527, the Court said: "Transportation is essential to commerce
or rather is commerce itself." See also Covington Bridge Co. v. Ken-
tucky, (1893) 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962; International
Text Book Co. v. Pigg, (1910) 217 U. S. 91, 107, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed.
678; The Pipe Line Cases, (1913) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed.
1459; United States v. Hill, (1919) 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143, 63
L. Ed. 337; United States v. Simpson, (1920) 252 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct.
364, 64 L. Ed. 665; (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 808; (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 836;
(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 708; (1923) 9 Va. L. Rev. 296.
The human direction or control may be far from complete, as in the case
of logs floating down a turbulent stream. Yet human connection with the
movement seems to be an essential element. See Thornton v. Wood, (1926)
271 U. S. 414, 425, 46 Sup. Ct. 585, 70 L. Ed. 1013; (1927) 21 Ill. L. Rev.
636.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT
The type of movement initially considered by the Court was
some more or less specific activity of navigation or transporta-
tion. The first case involved the operation of steamboats on the
waters of New York. 6  But with the industrial development of
the Nation, movement was considered as well in a far broader
signification, and in this meaning it was still referred to in terms
of commerce. Accordingly the expression "a current of com-
merce" has been used to designate a general course of traffic
across the country. Reference was had to a "current of com-
merce" of meats through the Chicago stockyards, 67 and to a sim-
ilar current of grain through the great grain elevators.6 8 It was
naturally conceived that the power to regulate commerce involved
the power to deal with this current. The current was but the
commerce, broadly viewed, of which the constitution spoke.
The stockyard cases will furnish useful illustrations. The
Court has declared that the case of Swift and Company v. United
States9 presented "a milestone in the interpretation of the com-
merce clause."17 0 The case is notable for an explicit declaration of
the idea here considered and for its application to the facts pre-
sented. In giving the opinion of the Court, justice Holmes said:
"Commerce among the states is not a technical legal concep-
tion, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."17
Continuing from this he referred to the movement of cattle from
the plains through the great stockyards and into other states as a
"current of commerce among the states." Under the circum-
stances presented, the purchase and sale of cattle in the stockyards
comprised a vital link in a customary and established series of
transactions which might fairly be said to have its beginning on
the plains of the West and its end in the homes of the East. Thus
Congress was allowed to deal with such sales, although, on the
surface, they were wholly intra-state matters.
66Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 208, 6 L. Ed. 23.
37Sivift and Company v. United States, (1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25
Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518. Compare Minnesota v. Blasius, (U.S. 1933.)
54 Sup. Ct. 34.
08See Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct.
244, 66 L. Ed. 458.
69(1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct 276,.49 L. Ed. 518.
70Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, (1923) 262 U. S. 1, 35, 43 Sup,
Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839.
7lSwift and Company v. United States, (1905) 196 U S. 375, 398, 25
Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518.
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The Court reiterated this view later, with reference to the
same subject, saying, in Stafford v. Wallace:72
"The stockyards are but a throat through which the current
flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incidents
to this current from the West to the East, and from one State
to another. Such transactions cannot be separated from the move-
ment to which they contribute and necessarily take on its charac-
ter. . . . The sales are not in this aspect merely local transac-
tions."7
The evils dealt with in the stockyard cases were monopolistic
and unfair trade and business practices which obstructed the flow
of commerce among the states. The cases admitted the existence
of the power in Congress to control such practices. And this was
true even though the practices, isolated and individually consid-
ered, were activities wholly within the boundaries of a state and
not parts of the physical process of movement. The extent of this
power was well illustrated in a late case.74 The money element in
contracts, and particularly in those contracts relating to personal
services, has in times past often been treated as if it had a peculiar
sanctity and exemption from legislative interference. 5  Yet the
Court sustained the regulation, under an Act of Congress, of
commissions charged by live stock brokers for selling stock in a
great stockyard, though these brokers employed but little property
and their charges were primarily compensation for their individ-
ual labors.
The broad power of Congress to foster interstate commerce
and to remove obstructions from its course is familiar. The ques-
tion may be suggested here as to the nature of an obstruction
within the meaning of this statement. With the expansion of the
idea of commerce to include a course of traffic or trade there must
come an expansion of ideas as to what constitutes a clog on such
commerce. The more extensive the subject, the greater will be
the possible varieties of interference. Since commerce is to be
considered as more than any specific act of movement, it is not
necessary that an interference relate to any such specific act.
72(1922) 258 U. S. 495, 515, 516, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735.
78This is quoted with approval in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,
(1923) 262 U. S. 1, 34, 35, 43 Sup. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839.
74Tagg Brothers v. United States, (1930) 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct
220, 74 L. Ed. 524.
7 5Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct.
394, 67 L. Ed. 785; Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47
Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718; Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S. 350, 48
Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L Ed. 913.
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Thus Congress could punish the forging of bills of lading.78 To
the defense that the bills, being false and representing no goods,
were beyond the power of Congress, since the transportation of
goods was not involved, it was properly answered that interstate
commerce would be weakened by the unrestrained right to fabri-
cate spurious bills of lading. Again in considering what consti-
tutes an obstruction the Court has declared:
"Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of inter-
state commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under
the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider
and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will
certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such
a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce
and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.1
7 7
As against the broadening stream of commerce it is asserted
that certain types of activity, such as production, have been de-
clared not to be interstate commerce. Thus the Court has stated:
"Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it.78
However, since practical considerations are to control, it is clearly
dangerous to isolate any activity and to declare that it is not inter-
state commerce if by that statement it is meant that under no con-
ditions can Congress deal with it. The activity and the regulation
in question must be taken together and in the light of the particu-
lar conditions. Thus viewed, the regulation may be deemed use-
ful to the flow of commerce. In such case the activity dealt with
will be called a part of the current of interstate commerce or inti-
mately connected with it. An effort to determine whether it is
properly placed with the former or the latter will be unfruitful so
far as federal power is concerned.
The broad sweep of the current of commerce may be ad-
mitted without implying that the current is all-inclusive. Though
the boundaries are vague, and though they fluctuate, it does not
follow that they are nonexistent. It may prove convenient to
classify businesses in three groups: (1) those which are engaged
in interstate commerce; (2) those which are engaged in intra-
71United States v. Ferger, (1919) 250 U. S. 199, 39 Sup. Ct. 445, 63
L. Ed. 936.77Stafford v. Wallace, (1922) 258 U. S. 495, 521, 42 Sup. Ct. 397,
66 L. Ed. 735.
78United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, 12, 15 Sup.
Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325. See Kidd v. Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup.
Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit
Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 194, 216, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729.
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state commerce but which materially affect interstate commerce;
and (3) those which are engaged in intrastate commerce without
materially affecting interstate commerce.79
Where Congress regulates that which is apparently an intra-
state activity, the regulation may find justification under the com-
merce clause on one of two grounds: (1) that under the circum-
stances in question the activity is in fact a part of the current of
commerce, in which case it would properly fall within the first
group mentioned; or, (2) that the activity though intrastate fur-
nishes an obstruction to interstate commerce. Differentiation be-
tween the two will often be difficult. In view of the fact that the
test of federal power over the activity regulated is the existence
of a material relation between the activity and interstate com-
merce, the differentiation is, of course, not determinative of that
power. However, the classification will prove convenient in ex-
amining the basis of the federal power.
Local enterprises will often be in direct competition with those
engaged in interstate commerce. Where the latter are subject to
stfingent regulations, from which the former are exempt, inter-
state commerce manifestly may suffer. If a burden is thereby
created, Congress may remove it by subjecting the intrastate com-
petitor to similar regulations. This result seems to be well within
the decided cases. 80
It is hard to conceive of an industry or activity which does not
in some way affect interstate commerce. If a man plants a patch
of potatoes in his back yard, he may feel reasonably assured that
he is engaged in a purely local enterprise. Yet the more food
produced locally, the less will be brought into and the more sent
out of the state. The patch of potatoes has an influence-slight,
it is true-on the movement of food supplies. If every activity
which bears any discernible relation to interstate commerce is sub-
ject to federal control, the commerce power has become all-em-
bracing. Congress could require a federal license for the planting
of a patch of potatoes.
The determining factor must be said to lie in the materiality
79See (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 90.
80See Houston, E. and W. Texas Ry. v. United States, (1914) 234
U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341; Railroad Commission of Wis-
consin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., (1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232,
66 L. Ed. 371; Alabama v. United States, (1929) 279 U. S, 229, 49 Sup. Ct.
266, 73 L. Ed. 675; Coleman, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Intra-
state Rates: The Shreveport Rate Cases, (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 34.
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of the relation between the activity regulated and interstate move-
ment and not merely in the fact that there'is some discernible con-
nection."' Accordingly it would appear, in the light of past deci-
sions, 8 2 that certain local businesses can not be brought within the
compulsory features of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
These businesses will be of a small and restricted nature. Some
obvious examples may be named, such as the barber shop, the
bootblacking establishment, the pressing shop, etc. Quite recently
a Federal court has refused to apply the Act to a cleaning and
dyeing establishment.8
One further observation should be made. It may be argued
that regulations which increase employment-even in such small
matters as causing two bootblacks to work where one worked be-
fore-increase prosperity and promote interstate commerce and
accordingly come within the scope of federal action. It must be
onswered, however, that under such a construction the commerce
clause has ceased to hold its former meaning as a specific grant
oi power. Congress would have the power to pass any laws which
it believed conducive to the public good. It is, of course, possible
that the nation would be better off. Yet it is suggested that it
would be a wiser policy, as it would certainly be a fairer use of
language, to accomplish this change by a constitutional amend-
ment rather than by reading the commerce clause as if it were
written: "Congress shall have power to provide for the general
welfare."
In conclusion it may be said that the commerce power of Con-
gress has been fairly and wisely construed to extend to the broad
course of traffic among the states and with foreign nations. Con-
gress may foster and protect this "current of commerce" and pro-
hibit those activities which obstruct or interfere with it. This
has been done even to the point of fixing the return for personal
81See United States v. DeWitt, (1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 41, 19 L. Ed.
545; Trade Mark Cases, (1879) 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550; Illinois Central
R. v. McKendree, (1906) 203 U. S. 514, 27 Sup. Ct. 153, 51 L. Ed. 298; The
Employers Liability Cases, (1908) 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed.
297; Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52
L. Ed. 436; Keller v. United States, (1909) 213 .U. S. 138, 29 Sup. Ct. 470,
53 L. Ed. 737; Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct.
529, 62 L. Ed. 1101; Florida v. United States, (1931) 282 .U. S. 194, 51
Sup. Ct. 119, 75 L. Ed. 291; Levering and Garrique Co. v. Morrin, (1933)
289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062.
82(1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 90.
83Purvis v. Bazemore, (D.C. Fla. Dec. 2, 1933). Compare Victor v.
Ickes, (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 1933) ; Stevens v. Black and White Cleaners
and Dyers Corp., (N.J. Ch. 1933).
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services. The whole commerce of this country consists of a num-
ber of these currents,- intermingled in a myriad of ways. Here
the whole. is at- least -equal to the: sum of its parts, and so far as
federal power is concerned -it may appear to be greater. Lest this
observation invite the ridicule of those who insist upon the rules
of addition, it should be explained that a unified and comprehen-
sive scheme of regulation may meet the test of constitutionality,
even though certain specific provisions in the scheme, if taken
alone, would fail. And finally, though the current is vast, there
are some local enterprises which can scarcely he included within
its limits. These, however, can have but small influence on the
effectiveness of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
